By: Shirley Pate - HaitiAnalysis.com

On January 9, 2007, Washington, DC’s Woodrow Wilson Center sponsored a panel discussion entitled, “Haiti: Can the International Community Make a Difference?” Given the international community’s lengthy history of involvement in Haiti, it seems an odd question. If you have been following Haiti over the last several years, you know that it has made a considerable difference in Haiti; unfortunately, it is of the most destructive kind.

When it comes to Haiti, the US is the dominant force in the international community. Both France and Canada have significant input in shaping Haiti policy, but neither is capable of moving the heavy levers of the machinery within international financial institutions (IFIs) and the United Nations Security Council to ensure that policies are implemented as planned. Throughout this article, when I say “international community,” I am referring to those components of the United Nations, the International Financial Institutions, and Washington policy think tanks over which the US exerts extraordinary influence.

In order to place the January 9 meeting at the Wilson Center in proper context, it is important to review recent events concerning Haiti.

A COSTLY TUG OF WAR

Early in the new millennium, the US, France, and Canada rolled out plans for the demise of Haiti’s democratically-elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, a priest guided by liberation theology as a way to achieve societal advancement, worried the international community. During the 1990’s, President Aristide began to resist the structural adjustment programs that IFIs required as a condition for obtaining loans. Most structural adjustment programs rob countries of their social programs and steer national economies toward privatization. Aristide knew that not only were the IFIs’ loan requirements onerous, but acceptance of these loans would condemn Haiti, like other poor countries, to perpetual indebtedness.

By the late 1990’s, with the founding of Fanmi Lavalas based on its opposition to privatization, the IFIs considered Aristide to be in outright rebellion against them. Later, when he proposed doubling the minimum wage and mandated a full 30% of the Haitian budget be dedicated to education, the US-dominated international community decided it was time to teach him a lesson. On the occasion of an electoral dispute in Haiti’s May 2000 elections, which paled in comparison to the Gore vs Bush electoral crisis in Florida that same year, the US falsely accused Aristide of stacking the deck. After this “undemocratic” characterization was circulated in the press, the main lesson was delivered. The US cancelled much of its assistance funding to Haiti and demanded that the IFIs follow suit. In the case of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the US directed the institution to block loans that had been approved already, a move considered highly contrary to IADB operating procedures. The IDB loans were intended for such critical needs as health, education, and infrastructure improvements. In an attempt to crush Aristide politically, the US’ full court press on the IFIs confirmed what many had thought for a long time: a healthier, better-paid, better-educated populace is the antithesis of what the international community seeks in Haiti.

THE COUP AND THE CELEBRATION

While the loans were being cancelled, the US was ramping up the campaign to destroy President Aristide personally. Through an underworld of US-invented non-governmental organizations and journalists for hire, the US established a network that planted scurrilous lies about the President in the international media which included everything from his appearance to charges of corruption. It was impressive teamwork that helped bring about the coup d’etat.

Over the course of a few years in the early 2000’s, the US funded and armed a group of “rebels,” (many of them among the most dangerous human rights abusers in Haiti) to attack Haiti from the Dominican Republic On February 29, 2004, amid fake reports issued by the US that Port-au-Prince was about to be captured by the “rebels,” President Aristide was kidnapped by US diplomats and marines, forced onto a US airplane, and sent to the Central African Republic. The US plane had barely set down in the capital, Bangui, when the Washington, think tanks, giddy over an Aristide-less Haiti, met to discuss what should be done next. The congratulatory back slapping could be heard all the way down in Port-au-Prince.

After three months participation in a multi-national force that entered Haiti before the coup, the US began planning the force’s retreat. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US and France quickly engineered a resolution to establish a peacekeeping force in Haiti (or MINUSTAH, as the force is known by its French acronym) under the command of Brazil. I n June 2004, the first MINUSTAH troops arrived and the second occupation of Haiti was underway.

In violation of the Haitian constitution, the US selected interim leaders for Haiti with Gerard Latortue serving as the prime minister of an illegal government. Latortue, a retired United Nations functionary, was known in the international community and seemed the perfect choice.

For the next two years, Latortue, collaborated with leftover “rebels,” elite Haitian businessmen, MINUSTAH commanders, diplomats from the US, France, and Canada, and the National Police to turn Haiti into a killing field. Aristide supporters were jailed, killed, and forced into exile. In a bizarre juxtaposition, shortly after the coup, the international community held a donors’ conference in Washington, DC signaling its intention to plunge back into Haiti. Loans were pledged and Haiti’s debts were reviewed.

As the illegal government settled in Port-au-Prince, Washington think tanks went full throttle with programs that featured new policy initiatives for Haiti such as infrastructure improvements and business development schemes. Yet in Haiti, the streets ran red with blood. Under Gerard Latortue, the repression of Aristide supporters by the state continued unbridled. MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police worked in tandem to terrorize the poorer sections of Port-au-Prince. On July 6, 2005, MINUSTAH committed a massacre when close to 400 soldiers entered Cite Soleil, a poor neighborhood known for its strong support of Aristide, shooting indiscriminately for hours. MINUSTAH maintains that it raided Cite Soleil to ferret out bandits, criminals, gang members, etc. In the end, scores were dead and wounded. With the high number of women and children among the victims, it is obvious that MINUSTAH was not looking for bad guys.

On December 22, 2006 another massacre took place in Cite Soleil that was eerily reminiscent of the July 2005 attack. In both instances, high-power weaponry was used, including attack helicopters. MINUSTAH soldiers shot indiscriminately in both cases. For both attacks, MINUSTAH failed to bring ambulances, customary for any operation in a densely populated area, and refused the Red Cross access to the wounded. In both massacres, MINUSTAH claims that it was “looking for bandits.”

It is clear that these massacres and others are mounted to intimidate Haitians who continue to call for the return of President Aristide and an end to the UN occupation. With each attack, the resistance builds.

THINK TANKERS AND “SECURITY”

In late 2005, Washington think tanks abruptly shifted focus from infrastructure improvements to the security situation in Haiti. As expected, the think tankers blamed Aristide supporters for the bad security situation. In Washington, new policies emerged through a maze of incestuous working relationships between think tankers, US government functionaries, corporate executives and corrupt media; in essence, the think tankers are nothing more than delivery boys. Little independent thinking is done in think tanks. Think tankers are adept at “recommending” new policies which are handed to them by the government and private industry, often just minutes before a public meeting. And this is how the issue of security in Haiti was passed through the system. A parade of present and former UN and State Department officials appeared at meetings, declared Haiti unsafe, and accused Aristide supporters of being at the center of all criminal activity -- robberies, shootings, kidnappings, etc.

Yet, many reports were coming out of Haiti suggesting that the kidnappings and much of the other serious crimes were committed by certain members of the Haitian National Police, along with criminals and some elites. Sadly, with the help of the journalists in the pay of the corporate media, the “Aristide supporters as bandits” scenario became “fact” in the media. The longstanding problems of poverty in Haiti were no longer discussed and the think tankers began to beat a loud drum for more money to improve security.

Interestingly, throughout all the discussions that took place about security, neither MINUSTAH, nor the Haitian National Police, nor Gerard Latortue was called to account for jeopardizing Haiti’s security by authorizing the murders and illegal detentions of thousands of Aristide supporters. It seems the victims were the only ones who viewed these heinous crimes as a threat to their and Haiti’s security.

Yet, even before Preval was elected, the security problem was thrown in his lap. In addition to concerns about “bandits and gangs,” the Washington think tankers became frantic about another security problem: legal, peaceful demonstrations by Aristide supporters. Demonstrations and the free speech that accompanies them are perverted by Washington. Peaceful demonstrations in Haiti are likely to become violent, so it is best to stop them before they start. But, even more threatening for Washington, the demonstrations are a sign to the world that Haitians are living under serious repression and that what the world has been reading in the newspapers and hearing on TV is a hoax. The fact that the “security” issue arose during Haiti’s campaign season should not be overlooked. When many forces combined to steal the election from Preval, the streets filled with his supporters. The international community tried to pressure Preval to get his supporters under control. Preval was quick to let all know that he did not intend to “police” the people of Haiti. But, as the TV news showed Preval’s supporters jumping in the pool at the elite Montana Hotel on their way to confront the electoral commission members who tried to rig the election, Washington realized its worst nightmare was becoming a reality. Preval would become president and the poor people were feeling emboldened.

Shortly after Preval’s election, he made a triumphal visit to Washington, DC. He spoke at the Organization of American States, filled up a huge auditorium to meet with the DC Haitian community, and made the rounds at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Shortly after he left, word leaked out that he told the money lenders that he wanted only one thing from them -- help with providing every Haitian a primary school education.

Needless to say, Latortue and his cohorts bled the national coffers dry. Preval, facing a seemingly insurmountable task, needed to get a foothold on the economy. Obtaining debt relief was critical. Accepting new loans could only worsen Haiti’s debt, a large percentage of which was accumulated during the Duvalier years. But, by the end of 2006, through the efforts of members of Congress, many groups, and individuals, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank announced their intentions to provide debt relief for Haiti. Yet, debt relief is a lengthy, tricky process with many hoops to jump through; how long it takes and what happens in the interim is the question.

After Preval’s election, fewer and fewer think tanks held programs about Haiti. One of the few that did, the US Institute of Peace, beat the security drum dutifully and stressed the need to beef up the Haitian National Police. Before long, the security “experts” announced yet another dimension to add to the mix. The criminal gangs were kidnapping foreigners. This meant business investment would be seriously jeopardized. The think tankers fired up a policy debut meeting in which recommendations they made recommendations to extend MINUSTAH’s mandate for several years and put the training of the Haitian National Police on the fast track. As a bonus, they suggested that the police receive the best equipment, including airplanes to assist with drug interdiction. Haiti’s mini military complex would thrive.

THE JANUARY 9 MEETING: SINKING THE SHIP

In the latter part of 2006, Haiti seemed to be off the radar screen. The notice about the January 9, Haiti meeting at the Wilson Center seemed sudden. Was the international community meeting to determine if it could help Haiti in spite of itself? Were they gathering to test the water on a new Haiti policy? What had changed in either Haiti or Washington recently that caused Haiti to be the Wilson Center’s first program of the new year? Presentations by two panelists would provide the answer. In the end, the panel discussion was the front for a referendum on Preval, in particular, and Haiti, in general. The participants weren’t there to test the water; they were there to announce their intention to sink the ship.

It is important to understand the part that the Woodrow Wilson Center plays in selling US foreign policy. Ensconced in a building named after Ronald Reagan, it sits between the US Environmental Protection Agency and the US Agency for International Development. It is filled with gleaming marble and sports its own dining room. It was established in 1968 by an act of Congress as a living memorial for President Woodrow Wilson. The Director is Lee Hamilton, former member of Congress, co-chair of the 911 investigation committee and, more recently, Jim Baker’s sidekick on the Iraq Study Group. The Center is used to rubber stamp whatever needs stamping. Virtually all of the Center’s events are covered on C-SPAN, a critical element for presenting “done deals” to the public.

One of the most intriguing panelists on the January 9 program was Gerard Le Chevallier. Le Chevallier, a former El Salvadoran legislator and National Democratic Institute functionary, was appointed electoral system czar for MINUSTAH in 2004. In October 2006, he was made the Director of Political Affairs and Planning for MINUSTAH and, according to his bio, serves as the right hand man to the head of MINUSTAH, Edmond Mulet. Le Chevallier used slides for his presentation and through these, along with his comments, he revealed things that most diplomats would only share over a drink with a trusted colleague. On a slide that listed the factors threatening Haiti’s security, one read, “radical supporters of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.” While MINUSTAH maintains it raids poor neighborhoods only to apprehend bandits and kidnappers, the political affairs director confirms that the raids are politically motivated.

While discussing a slide entitled “Challenges Facing President Preval,” Le Chevallier made the comment that there is concern about the security situation in Haiti and investors might consider “replacing Preval.”

And then, Le Chevallier, former electoral czar for the MINUSTAH in Haiti, expressed concern about the large number of political parties in Haiti and suggested that the National Democratic Institute & the International Republican Institute “put together” some political parties

When asked whether he thought the Haitian constitution was problematic because it mandates so many different elections which are extremely expensive to finance, he replied jokingly, “look, I come from El Salvador and a general area where when there is a problem with the constitution, you make a coup d’etat.” At the end of his presentation, realizing he needed to do some damage control, he stated that only the Haitian people could change their constitution and that the UN was there to do what the Haitian people wanted. This would be a revelation to many in Haiti.

For a diplomat, his remarks were incredibly reckless. Or were they? Perhaps the time had arrived when a UN representative can appear on CSPAN at a Washington think tank event and declare that Haitians who support Aristide are a security threat, that the US government should fund the establishment of Haitian political parties, and that a coup d’etat is not out of the question for a democratically-elected president.

Just when it seemed that the plot could not get any thicker, it did. Caroline Anstey, Country Director for the Caribbean in the Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank, closed the deal. After obligatory statements about debt relief, she stated in the Q&A session that “three-fourths of Haiti is open for business” and that “there are insecure areas in many countries.” She used Kingston, Jamaica as an example, saying that development was proceeding outside Jamaica’s capital. She said that the best thing might be to “leave it be,” referring to Port-au-Prince.

So that was it. MINUSTAH lost the battle in the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince The poor people fought the occupation and won. But, when poor people win, they often lose. MINUSTAH’s defeat means a shift to a policy of bloody containment. The poor neighborhoods will be strict encampments run by MINUSTAH troops in which residents, who are lucky enough to have jobs, will be allowed out only long enough to do a sweatshop shift for slave wages. And, the national ID card that was shoved down Haitians’ throats will be used like South Africa’s “pass” system.

As with Jamaica, the money for Haiti will be pumped outside Port-au-Prince. One can expect world class airports to be built on both the north and south coasts of Haiti so that the money lenders, the business investors, and the tourists can avoid Port-au-Prince altogether.

By pursuing this policy, the US-dominated international community is endorsing a scenario where nothing improves inside the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. Clean water, good sanitation, consistent electricity, proper schools, and health care, all critical elements for the success of the country and its people, will be further out of reach than ever.

When poor people win, they often lose.

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Shirley Pate is a Haiti solidarity activist in Washington, DC. She can be contacted at haiticuba@haitioye.net